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ABSTRACT 19 
 20 
This paper analyzes key issues facing subcontractors in the context of a severe economic crisis, 21 
aiming to detect the factors that are critical for the survival of the subcontractors. While previous 22 
research efforts have analyzed factors related to subcontractor performance in regular financial 23 
conditions, there remains only sparse knowledge of how subcontractors are to survive when 24 
economic conditions become dire as they have in recent times in the Spanish construction market. In 25 
this research, in-depth interviews with managers of relevant Spanish subcontracting companies 26 
were carried out, resulting in the identification of eight factors for subcontractor survival: project 27 
delivery method, demand, financial capital, relationship assets, managerial assets, human assets, 28 
legal framework, and geographic scope. The project delivery method used by the owner and also by 29 
the main contractor is mainly based on price. As a result, the subcontractors’ bids get lower, making 30 
them unsustainable in the long run. Furthermore, subcontractors do not get financial support from 31 
banks easily in order to cover their additional financial costs. These facts push subcontractors to get 32 
a guarantee of payment by the main contractor, while subcontracting companies may even ask for 33 
payments in advance. Subcontractors also seek long-term relationships with the contractor. These 34 
trusting relations are very often a prerequisite to qualify and bid for contracts. Subcontractors have 35 
to continuously improve, plan ahead and adapt quickly to the new environment.  Therefore, 36 
subcontractors must remain flexible and maintain a lean hierarchical organization. Doing so makes it 37 
is easier for subcontractors to compete in both their native markets, as well as abroad. To this end, 38 
the most successful subcontractors have become international during the expansion phase of the 39 
economic cycle; many of them went abroad with the help of a contractor from their home country. 40 
 41 
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 45 
INTRODUCTION 46 
 47 
A country’s economy is significantly influenced by the construction sector, not only because of the 48 
construction activities per se, but also because of the related industries that supply equipment and 49 
materials, as well as services such as engineering and architectural consultancy, operation activities, 50 
and facility management. The significance of the sector is reflected by its relative weight in the Gross 51 
Domestic Product (GDP): approximately 10% for the whole European Union (FIEC 2007) and 13% for 52 
Spain in 2006 (SEOPAN 2012). However, the financial crisis of 2007 hit the construction industry 53 
heavily (Ichniowski 2012; Villegas et al. 2012). This is especially true for Spain and other Southern 54 
European countries, where the sector has seen a 75% reduction in residential building production, 55 
67% drop in public procurement, and accounts for approximately 75% of job losses in Spain, during 56 
the 2007-2011 period (SEOPAN 2012). In view of this scenario, the largest Spanish construction 57 
companies have increased their production in foreign countries (Martin and Gonzalez 2010; Villegas 58 
et al. 2012). Spanish contractors are, after the Chinese, the second most successful worldwide (9% of 59 
the total), and the first in Latin America, with a 32% share of the market (ENR 2012). 60 
 61 
In the Spanish construction industry, the design-bid-build project delivery method accounts for 75% 62 
of public procurement, whereas the remaining 25% consists basically of concession contracts 63 
(SEOPAN 2012). There are only two types of contracts regarding payment provisions in view of the 64 
Spanish Law 03/2011 on Public Contracts: unit-price (according to a bill of quantities) and fixed-price 65 
(or lump sum); the former is the more habitual one, whereas the latter is only admissible under strict 66 
circumstances (de la Cruz et al. 2006). Even though there is no official data regarding private 67 
contracts, the design-bid-build delivery method is used most often because of the regulations 68 
imposed by Law 38/1999 on Building and the traditional modus operandi of the industry (Pellicer 69 
and Victory 2006); the Law 38/1999 overprotects the architect as an independent professional and 70 
deters in fact other alternative delivery methods. Lump-sum and unit price payment provisions are 71 
both equally implemented for residential buildings. Only industrial or commercial entrepreneurs use 72 
relationship-based or integrated delivery strategies (García-Monsalve 2005). 73 
 74 
Regarding the procurement procedures, two of them are mainly used by public and private owners: 75 
(1) open bid (or low bid), where only the price is considered; and (2) a one-stage request for 76 
proposals (RFP), where the price, the technical proposal, the schedule, the quality and safety control 77 
procedures, and the team experience are the factors generally considered (Pellicer and Victory 78 
2006). When using a one-stage RFP in public contracts, the price is the factor more weighted (at 79 
least 50%) because of requirements imposed by the European Union through Directive 2004/18/EC 80 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works, supply and service contracts. 81 
Furthermore, the two-stage RFP is rarely used by owners. However, private owners sometimes use 82 
the pre-qualified bid or sole source procurement strategies. 83 
 84 
In this scenario, most of the time contractors are selected based on low price as the main factor of 85 
the bid. The owner's project delivery strategy forces the contractors to select subcontractors based 86 
on low price too, even though the contract between these two parties is always private from a legal 87 
standpoint. Relationships among the different stakeholders (owner, designer, main contractor, and 88 
subcontractors) are adversarial, and collaboration is not sought (de la Cruz et al. 2006). Main 89 
contractors do not perceive subcontractors as cooperators either (Kumaraswamy and Matthews 90 
2000; Mason 2010). Subcontracting in Spain is regulated by Law 3/2011 on Public Contracts and Law 91 
32/2006 on Subcontracting in Construction. These regulations allow for subcontracting up to a 92 
maximum of 60% of the total turnover of the construction project and for three tiers of 93 
subcontracting only, including the self-employed workers in the lower tier. 94 
 95 
To a limited extent some research has been done regarding the behavior of the construction 96 
industry during recession periods; most of the contributors have developed prediction models for 97 
implementation in construction companies. Kangari (1988) analyzes the effect of macroeconomic 98 
factors on construction companies’ failures comparing different ratios and proposing a model 99 
obtained from a multiple regression analysis; later on, this model is tuned up and focused on the 100 
company’ financial performance (Kangari et al. 1992). A similar approach is followed by Langford et 101 
al. (1993) and Abidali and Harris (1995) using multivariate discriminant analysis, and by Hall (1994) 102 
using logit regressions instead. Arditi et al. (2000) present an alternative approach grouping the 103 
causes of failure in view of the environment conditions and the company’s response; they conclude 104 
that most of the failures are due to budgetary and macroeconomic reasons. Later contributions deal 105 
with the specificities of the Asian economic crisis of the late twentieth century in Hong-Kong (Chan 106 
et al. 2005) and Korea (You and Zi 2007). Lim et al. (2010) also deal with the Asian economic crisis in 107 
Singapore through a survey that provides an in-depth analysis of the survival strategies used by 108 
contractors. Finally, Jung et al. (2012) evaluate the international performance of Korean contractors 109 
over a complete cycle of expansion-contraction-expansion. These two last contributions are 110 
somehow contradictory in their main implications: whereas the former claims that main contractors 111 
should stick to its basic business, the latter proposes an international diversification strategy; both 112 
papers, however, highlight the importance of financial soundness for the survival of the firms. 113 
  114 
The above contributions have broadened the body of knowledge on the behavior of the construction 115 
industry during economic downturns. Nevertheless, these studies are focused on the behavior and 116 
performance of the main contractors, in particular, or on the construction industry, in general. 117 
Moreover, some authors have analyzed subcontracting companies using different approaches, as it 118 
will be seen in the following section, but none of them has approached their performance in an 119 
economic crisis scenario. In this competitive market of very low demand and high supply, 120 
contractors and subcontractors have to adapt to the new environment (Villegas et al. 2012). 121 
 122 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the issues facing subcontractors in this scenario of 123 
severe economic crisis, and the study aims to detect the factors that are critical for these companies 124 
to survive. The research question can be stated as follows: What are the factors facilitating the 125 
survival of subcontractors in a scenario of severe economic crisis? The research involved in-depth 126 
interviews with managers of relevant subcontracting companies; all the subcontractors are still in 127 
business and they have good reputations in the industry. In the following sections, we will discuss 128 
the relevant literature, describe the research method, and explain the results (survival factors); the 129 
discussion includes references that support arguments, as well as counter-references, and direct 130 
quotes from the interviewees in order to enrich the argument. Finally, the main contributions of the 131 
research, its managerial implications, and the future lines or research are drawn in the Conclusions 132 
section. 133 
 134 
 135 
LITERATURE BACKGROUND 136 
 137 
Subcontracting is defined as the outsourcing of the tasks that differ the most from the main activity 138 
of the contractor; these tasks are awarded to other companies named subcontractors, which supply 139 
materials, equipment and manpower (González-Díaz et al. 2000; Yik and Lai 2008; Ng et al. 2009; 140 
Tam et al. 2011). The supply chain has several tiers (or layers) of outsourcing: companies that work 141 
directly for the main contractor (top-tier), and companies that work for the former (low-tier or sub-142 
subcontractors); there may be additional tiers of sub-subcontractors until reaching the lowest tier of 143 
self-employed workers (Yik and Lai 2008). Thus, the supply chain becomes a multi-tier 144 
subcontracting system (Choudry et al. 2012). 145 
 146 
Because of the uneven demand of the construction sector (Winch 1998; Tam et al. 2011), 147 
subcontracting allows the main contractor to transfer the risk to the subcontractor, in cascade 148 
subsequently in the supply chain (Beardsworth et al. 1988; Hsieh 1997; Ng et al. 2009; Choudry et al. 149 
2012). This transfer of risk takes into consideration the workload pressures and resources 150 
constraints, as well as financial profits (Beardsworth et al. 1988; Ng et al. 2009). The main contractor 151 
avoids hiring all the planned resources (workforce, plant, equipment) to carry out the project 152 
awarded (Choudry et al. 2012). The main contractor (and top-tier subcontractors, too) reduce their 153 
overhead costs and retain fewer full-time workers. Other risks, such as errors in estimating or 154 
additional payments to the workforce (over time or insurance), are also transferred to the 155 
subcontractor (Loh and Ofori 2000). 156 
 157 
Division of labor increases operative efficiency of the construction project, adding as many tiers of 158 
subcontracting as required by the magnitude and difficulty of the project (Elazouni and Metwally 159 
2000; Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005; Tam et al. 2011). Given the specialization and experience 160 
provided by subcontractors (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Choudry et al. 2012), subcontracting also 161 
introduces the main contractor to other geographical markets, increasing the efficiency in projects 162 
by using local subcontractors (González-Díaz et al. 2000). Overall, subcontracting increases flexibility, 163 
making the whole supply chain system more resilient (Winch 1998; Yik and Lai 2008; Zou and Lim 164 
2006). 165 
 166 
There are, however, a series of problems created with subcontracting. Low-tier subcontractors use 167 
cheaper labor, equipment and materials (Low and Sua 2000; Tam et al. 2011); this means poor 168 
business practices and performance (Schaufelberger 2003; Yik and Lai 2008; Ng et al. 2009; Tam et 169 
al. 2011) and a final product of low quality (Elazouni and Metwally 2000; Tam et al. 2011; Choudry et 170 
al. 2012). Some authors blame this bad performance on the conflicts and risks that are pushed down 171 
the hierarchy from the main contractor to subcontractors, leading to antagonistic and contentious 172 
relationships (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000; Eom et al. 2008). 173 
 174 
The growing number of firms involved in the process makes communication throughout the supply 175 
chain particularly inefficient (Yik and Lai 2008; Choudry et al. 2012). Thus, there is an additional need 176 
to coordinate and control (Elazouni and Metwally 2000; Tam et al. 2000) in order to somehow 177 
neutralize the reduction of overhead costs mentioned earlier. By accepting risk from the main 178 
contractors, the subcontractors are more vulnerable to market fluctuation, especially the low-tier 179 
firms (Schaufelberger 2003; Ng et al. 2009; Yik and Lai 2008). In many countries, there is no specific 180 
regulation on subcontracting in general, nor is there a legal framework for formal contracts between 181 
the different companies in the supply chain (Yik and Lai 2008; Choudry et al. 2012). All this hinders 182 
the accountability among the parties when problems appear (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Choudry et al. 183 
2012). 184 
 185 
Subcontracting is a worldwide practice in the construction industry. Specific reports have been 186 
published about subcontracting in countries such as the United States (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Arditi 187 
and Chotibhongs 2005), Hong Kong (Yik and Lai 2008; Ng et al. 2009; Tam et al. 2011), Taiwan (Hsieh 188 
1998), the United Kingdom (Winch 1998; Briscoe and Dainty 2005), Pakistan (Choudry et al. 2012), 189 
Japan (Reeves 2002), Brazil (Oviedo-Haito 2010), Australia (Zou and Lim 2006), or Spain (González-190 
Díaz 2000), to cite a few. In spite of being a universal modus operandi, subcontracting depends on 191 
the construction culture and specific regulations of each country. 192 
 193 
 194 
RESEARCH METHOD 195 
 196 
The grounded theory method (Glaser 1978 and 2002; Charmaz 2006) was chosen for this study, 197 
which aims to find out the factors facilitating the survival of subcontractors in a scenario of severe 198 
economic crisis. The research explained in this paper does not require developing a theory; 199 
nevertheless, the concept-indicator model (Glaser 1978) was used to systematically collect, codify 200 
and compare the emerging categories found. This research is exploratory in its nature. The data was 201 
collected through in-depth open-ended interviews (Woodside 2010). 202 
 203 
The sample criteria to select the interviewees were established in the following way. In a previous 204 
research developed by one of the authors regarding the implementation of project management 205 
practices by Spanish contractors (Sutrisna et al. 2012), 12 contractors were investigated; this sample 206 
included three large companies (with annual turnover above 2.5 billion Euros) and nine medium 207 
companies (with annual turnover between 75 and 400 million Euros). The interviewees (senior 208 
managers and heads of departments from these main contractors) had to provide a short-list of 209 
reliable subcontractors per sub-fields. Out of a list of more than 50 subcontractors, 12 of them were 210 
chosen considering their preference among the main contractors and their accessibility (the 211 
subcontractors had to agree to participate in the research). 212 
 213 
Another target was to cover all the main sub-fields or trades within a construction project in order to 214 
guarantee a minimum homogeneity among participants. Every firm analyzed included labor among 215 
its outsourced resources, and had a minimum annual turnover of two million Euros and ten full-time 216 
workers. Furthermore, the interviewees are senior managers of subcontracting companies with a 217 
minimum of ten years of experience. 218 
 219 
The sample size was obtained by theoretical saturation (Glaser 1978 and 2002; Charmaz 2006). 220 
According to Guest et al. (2009), if there is homogeneity in the sample, saturation is achieved 221 
between the eighth and twelfth interview. In this research, it was attained after the eighth interview 222 
too. Four additional interviews were conducted as means of confirmation, but they brought very 223 
little new information to the aggregate findings. The 12 interviewees and their corresponding 224 
companies are described in Table 1. The companies are classified according to the service offered, 225 
experience, workforce, turnover, and size; the size of the company is obtained according to the 226 
business turnover of the company only (European Commission 2003), as follows (see Table 1): (S) 227 
less than 10 million Euros; (M) between 10 and 50 million Euros; and (G) over 50 million Euros. 228 
 229 
The data were collected with a protocol that used relevant questions to be followed during the 230 
interview. It also complied with the usual characteristics of long interviews, as described by 231 
Woodside (2010). This guided questionnaire had two main parts: one characterizing the company 232 
and the interviewee (Table 1), and the other describing the value chain and its interaction with the 233 
environment. Given the exploratory approach of the study, deviation from the issue at hand was 234 
allowed by the interviewer when other topics of interest were raised by the interviewees. In this 235 
new scenario of economic downturn, it was especially important to determine: (a) if the firm had to 236 
adapt somehow in order to survive; and (b) what issues were more relevant for the survival of the 237 
firm. Knowledge acquired this way was brought up in subsequent interviews to determine if it was 238 
just an individual opinion or one of general consensus. The whole procedure took around three 239 
hours per interviewee. The collected data was transcribed, read again, and organized. After a second 240 
reading, it was subjected to coding procedures. A final reading led to writing the memos; these 241 
memos take the researcher from data to conceptualization, determining the core categories 242 
(Charmaz 2006). These categories were constantly compared with data coming from new interviews, 243 
as well as from the literature review, using triangulation until saturation (Charmaz 2006). This 244 
protocol allowed core categories to emerge and explain theoretically how the phenomenon under 245 
study works (Glaser 2002; Charmaz 2006). 246 
 247 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 248 
 249 
 250 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 251 
 252 
Even though the final aim of the research process was to identify the core categories, their 253 
explanation and justification followed a reverse logic. First, the core categories obtained as a final 254 
output of the research were stated, and later they were justified and analyzed thoroughly. From the 255 
interviews, many indicators were identified and they were coded as 34 factors or subcategories; 256 
they were grouped into eight final categories: financial capital, legal framework, demand, geographic 257 
scope, project delivery system, managerial assets, human assets, and relationship assets. Table 2 258 
describes the set of 34 subcontractor survival factors for each one of these core categories. 259 
 260 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 261 
 262 
As stated in the previous section, it was important to determine the factors that were especially 263 
relevant for the survival of the firm in an economic downturn. Table 2 highlights in bold those factors 264 
that facilitate the survival of subcontractors in a scenario of severe economic crisis from those 265 
factors that allow the survival or success of a subcontractor in any stage of the economic cycle 266 
(sometimes simply making more profit). Nine out of 34 factors, representing five out of eight core 267 
categories, are specifically relevant in economic downturns. The other 25 factors can be considered 268 
valid for any economic situation. Several authors (Schleifer 1990; Hall 1994; Arditi et al. 2000; Lim et 269 
al. 2010) have already considered some of these general factors for contractors. Their contributions 270 
are taken into consideration later in the discussion in order to: (a) differentiate between general and 271 
specific factors; and (b) support (or not) the opinions of the interviewees. 272 
 273 
The survival factors obtained through this research are explained, analyzed and justified, per group 274 
of categories, in the following sub-sections. References supporting these factors, as well as some 275 
counter-references, are also included in the discussion. Furthermore, comments from the 276 
interviewees (verbatim) enrich the argument; each quotation is referred to the corresponding 277 
interviewee in parentheses according to Table 1. The process of analysis and comparison of direct 278 
quotes and references supporting evidence lead to the final factors listed in Table 2. 279 
 280 
Financial Capital 281 
 282 
During the expansion phase of an economic cycle, subcontractors are driven by each contract's 283 
profitability measured as profit from sales (Ng et al. 2009). However, in the current crisis 284 
environment, mistrust increases along with the risks, producing shortages and higher costs of 285 
interest, thus hampering subcontractors´ access to credits and affecting their profit margin directly 286 
(Wood and Ellis 2005). Crisis scenarios also favor opportunistic behaviors in agents of the 287 
construction industry, mostly in general contractors (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005). For their own 288 
profit, they impose conditions with their bargaining power, encouraging market malpractices, e.g. 289 
contractors finance the project based on deferred payments to subcontractors (Mason 2010): 290 
“Banks, in their distrust, do not lend us money to finance our operation as subcontractors; we have 291 
waiting periods as long as 270 days to receive progress payments from our clients” (E8). 292 
 293 
Having credit becomes a key factor from the moment that subcontractors must pay for materials in 294 
advance, equipment and manpower sent to the building site (Schleifer 1990; Ng et al. 2009). Their 295 
recovery period is much longer than their payment period, especially since the workers’ wages are 296 
paid within 30 days (Arditi et al. 2000). By assuming the additional financial cost, subcontractors 297 
need additional financial support (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005). The problem is more serious when 298 
banks restrict their credit policies. 299 
 300 
While in good times subcontractors could afford to increase prices with additional financial costs 301 
(Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005), nowadays the insolvency of contractors and banks’ loss of confidence 302 
has made subcontractors’ situations far more critical (Yik and Lai 2008): "I am not a bank and I have 303 
no ability to finance the work of my clients" (E2). Now it is essential for subcontractors to make a 304 
preliminary selection of clients, and carefully analyze the payment method (Ng et al. 2009). 305 
Specifically, they try to avoid being paid by promissory notes because if the subcontractor deducts 306 
them and in the end the client does not pay, the bank will charge the amount due plus interest to 307 
the subcontractor (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005). 308 
 309 
Companies that were more aware of the financial risk, or those that were able to change the focus in 310 
time, have managed to stay successful in this new scenario (Schleifer 1990): "For me the priority has 311 
always been to get paid; otherwise, I cannot pay my workers’ wages" (E6). In these conditions, it is 312 
essential “to be financially sound to work" (E4). Any dysfunction in the capital market may be 313 
amplified and subcontractors feel it deeply (Chiang 2009): "Banks have closed the credit tap; there is 314 
lack of cash flow in financial markets” (E6). The problem is that banks lack the confidence to lend to 315 
any business related to the construction sector, even for those subcontractors who have always met 316 
their financial obligations; that were not the case during the expansion phase (Arditi et al 2000). 317 
 318 
Shortly before the start of the crisis, hardly anyone cared about the payment method and most only 319 
negotiated the maturity of the payment document (Ng et al. 2009). The situation has changed 320 
dramatically: "I only accept contracts if I’m paid with confirmation or endorsement; if not, I have to 321 
assume too much risk" (E11). More and more subcontractors are now under a debt renegotiation 322 
process with their clients, and many of them were quick to point out: "The possibilities of us getting 323 
paid are minimal; we have given up on that money, or at least the majority of it" (E10). Another 324 
interviewee stated that "at this moment, we cannot increase investment in new machinery and 325 
equipment" (E8). 326 
 327 
Legal Framework 328 
 329 
The existence of a well-established and consolidated legal framework forces subcontractors to 330 
continuously improve (Sese et al. 2002). Since the approval of Spanish Law 31/1995 on Occupational 331 
Risk Prevention, safety conditions on building sites have also significantly gotten better (Rubio et al. 332 
2008). This has been an opportunity for many companies which once bet on this strategy. This 333 
makes it easier for them to compete in their home market, and also when they decide to go abroad. 334 
There is widespread agreement among the interviewees that legal compliance has helped them 335 
enhance their businesses: "The law on subcontracting has helped remove many commission agents 336 
that were not really companies at all" (E2). However, other authors (Tam et al. 2011) indicate that 337 
this increasing compliance with the law is not a general rule worldwide. 338 
 339 
The existence of sector agreements that ensure guarantees for workers in the construction sector 340 
has had not only a severe impact on wages, but it has also brought improvements in risk prevention 341 
and training: "We cannot have unskilled laborers working at sites except to do very basic and low-342 
risk tasks" (E1 and E12). In this scenario, companies prefer to train these workers so they can 343 
perform as skilled workers. 344 
 345 
However, there are still shady aspects that the legal framework has failed to change, despite the 346 
various regulations issued. The main one is the regulation of payment to subcontractors, with the 347 
late payments as the most relevant example. Even though the deadline for payments is established 348 
in 60 days, "typically, you're offered payments delays between 180 and 210 days; the problem is 349 
that if I don’t accept these conditions, there are many other companies that are willing to do so" (E3 350 
and E8). In any event, general contractors claim that public agencies do not meet their payment 351 
obligations either. 352 
 353 
Demand 354 
 355 
In a crisis scenario, there is a clear downward pressure on costs from the demand side. The 356 
downstroke of prices is not sustainable in the long run: "To apply a discount is an option that can be 357 
taken very easily" (E8). This can lead more professionalized companies into a difficult situation if 358 
they are continuously selling below cost (Schleifer 1990; Arditi et al. 2000; Lim et al. 2010), 359 
consciously or unconsciously: "Clients always want the cheapest" (E5). This stereotype must be 360 
broken for the mutual interest of all parties. 361 
 362 
This question is particularly critical for bidders with less differentiation in their trade (Dainty et al. 363 
2001): "Our clients are not willing to pay more for the differences in our bids" (E6). It is therefore 364 
necessary to continue looking for distinguishing characteristics which are valuable for the client even 365 
in a crisis scenario; characteristics which were differential five years ago are no longer. Once this 366 
problem is detected, subcontractors must find a way to escape this spiral which is very dangerous 367 
for firms: "We are trying to make new valuable proposals to access the market segments that had 368 
not been reached previously" (E5). 369 
 370 
At the peak of the crisis, all the interviewed subcontractors met the requirements of the market. 371 
Even some subcontractors consider that being hired through price bids is positive: “It forces us to 372 
keep up and pay attention to changes in the market and our competitors" (E10). Thus, it seems 373 
much more productive to have a proactive attitude to changes in demand: "We are now recruiting 374 
through fixed-term work contracts to cover peak demand for labor" (E10). This challenges the typical 375 
defeatist attitude that eventually leads to the failure of the company: "There is much uncertainty, 376 
poor and very poorly paid work" (E9). 377 
 378 
Another of the most common inefficiencies arising on the demand side is that contractors work 379 
throughout the whole process regardless of all the interference between the activities carried out by 380 
different subcontractors. Those tasks left in no man's land finally generate unforeseen cost overruns 381 
for the contractor. The subcontractor makes a profit in the short-term out of these "unexpected 382 
events". But the successful subcontractor that establishes long-term relationships with clients is the 383 
one who can warn the contractor of future problems and, at the same time, include these 384 
contingencies in the bid. These gaps between different tasks affect not just the construction phase, 385 
but also the design phase and then have implications in the operational phase of the project as well. 386 
 387 
Geographic Scope 388 
 389 
Subcontractors that are performing best during the crisis scenario have also adapted their 390 
geographical scope. The most pronounced trend is internationalization. In general, all stakeholders 391 
in the production chain (developers, construction companies, engineers, subcontractors and 392 
suppliers) have considered extending their scope (Martin and Gonzalez 2010). Local companies have 393 
broadened their scope to the whole country and the larger ones have become international 394 
(Schleifer 1990; Jung et al. 2010 and 2012), the difference being the period cycle in which companies 395 
have taken this decision. It is not the same to become international as a long-term strategy (during 396 
the expansion phase of the cycle, mainly) than it is to work based on short-term need (economic 397 
contraction cycle). 398 
 399 
A very particular behavior pattern in subcontractors is to go abroad with the help of a compatriot 400 
contractor (Arditi et al. 2000); this way, subcontractors try to spread their risks on a larger portfolio 401 
of projects to limit the risks associated with country-specific issues (Jung et al. 2010): "We are well-402 
known in Spain and so they trust us abroad" (E7). Those who have not yet taken the step of 403 
internationalization are conscious that this is the best way: "I am currently making international bids 404 
for my best customer" (E11). However if the proposal to go abroad comes from unknown 405 
companies, the response is different: "I have had proposals to work abroad, but they did not seem 406 
reliable enough" (E3). Jung et al. (2010) also found that this pattern is not usually successful and 407 
other authors considered that expansion beyond the capabilities of the firm might be unwise 408 
(Schleifer 1990; Arditi et al. 2000; Lim et al. 2010). The decision to internationalize is even more 409 
complex if the subcontractor’s activity requires substantial investment in equipment: "I will only 410 
invest abroad if I have secured contracts with a client I know well" (E6). 411 
 412 
Project Delivery Method 413 
 414 
Contractors tend to make the final decision to award a contract primarily based on the bid price 415 
(Arditi et al. 2000; Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000). They are not willing to pay a higher price for 416 
the higher quality that subcontractors often wield in their sales pitches (Tam et al. 2011). However, 417 
the key factor for many successful subcontractors is that they are able to offer extras that add value 418 
and that the contractor can transfer to his client, generating a win-win scenario (Eom et al. 2008). 419 
Ultimately, this helps to improve the contractual relationship between them. 420 
 421 
The main contractor’s bargaining power can also be applied to transfer the risks the company takes 422 
in its contract with its client through clauses in the subcontracts (Dainty et al. 2001); hence, the 423 
subcontractor can do little to minimize the risks transferred to him. The contractual relationship 424 
between contractor and subcontractor is always subject to the lack of bargaining power of the latter 425 
towards his client (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Chiang 2009). This is exacerbated when similar bids can 426 
be found between different subcontractors (Reeves 2002). The key to differentiation and to gain a 427 
better bargaining position lies in the subcontractor’s ability to differentiate his product by adding a 428 
good dose of services to facilitate his client’s work (Gonzalez-Diaz et al. 2000; Dainty et al. 2001). Ng 429 
et al. (2009) claimed that managerial skills of subcontractors influence the awarding decision of the 430 
main contractor; however, the findings of this research do not support this claim. Further, in a crisis 431 
scenario it is more difficult to overcome the lack of bargaining power, and the contractor reinforces 432 
his position bringing prices down (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005): "They take 433 
advantage of the situation asking us for contractual guarantees of about 5% of the contract, and 434 
they hold them longer than they should” (E11). In this scenario, bid-shopping is very frequently the 435 
norm (Hinze and Tracey 1994; Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005). 436 
 437 
When the infrastructure life cycle follows the separate stages of the traditional design–bid–build 438 
sequence, usually integration problems appear in the project too. This is because the knowledge of 439 
previous stages is not incorporated in the later ones, causing uncertainties in the final product and 440 
inefficiencies in the execution (Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000; Dainty et al. 2001). All this leads 441 
to poorly defined projects (Arditi et al. 2000); therefore, the ability of some subcontractors to work 442 
hand-in-hand with their clients to solve these problems with mutual benefit, is a competitive 443 
advantage (Ng et al. 2009). For other subcontractors, their lack of design skills is a source of conflict 444 
with the main contractor. It is not simply a question of transferring risks to the subcontractor, 445 
copying the clauses that bind the contractor with the owner: it is about considering the 446 
subcontractor as a collaborator (Dainty et al. 2001). 447 
 448 
Major contractors often ask for several versions of bids, extending the selection period of 449 
subcontractors. The problem is to the contractor’s disadvantage: "When you are awarded the 450 
contract, you have to start the very next day and you always begin with a delay" (E3). The ability to 451 
react quickly is not common to all subcontractors, yet it is highly valued by their clients 452 
(Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000; Dainty et al. 2001). The lack of agreement on the start date 453 
frequently spreads to the whole works schedule. Therefore, the scheduling of the project is not 454 
usually negotiated, but rather imposed by the contractor; the subcontractor simply complies with it 455 
without any possibility of adapting it at his discretion (Eom et al. 2008). 456 
 457 
Managerial Assets 458 
 459 
Subcontractors do not usually follow a systematic management process at their construction sites. 460 
For example, among the interviewed companies, only one is certified in processes (ISO 9001, ISO 461 
14001 and OSHAS 18001), whereas five are only certified in product quality; the rest of them do not 462 
have any certification of this kind. Furthermore, all the subcontractors stated that flexibility is one of 463 
their main competitive advantages in business management: "We have the flexibility to revert our 464 
organization to the 2007 scenario very quickly, even tomorrow" (E10). Such statements are possible 465 
because subcontractors are small businesses with an organization completely centralized in the 466 
owner or CEO (Arditi et al. 2000).  467 
 468 
In this case, the entire management process of the company is determined by the personality of the 469 
founder, rather than by training, which is rarely college level (Schaufelberger, 2003). In these 470 
companies, the first step towards professionalizing management is taken in finance and accounting: 471 
"Our priority is to bring an analytical accounting system that would allow us to obtain economic data 472 
contract by contract" (E2). In fact, before taking this step, subcontractors usually outsource financial 473 
management and accounting services through small financial and economic consulting firms. As 474 
subcontractors are progressing professionally, they require more and more information and 475 
communication tools (Hall 1994), as well as administrative software (Schleifer 1990). However, only 476 
large subcontracting companies use Enterprise Resource Planning packages. 477 
 478 
Human Assets 479 
 480 
Human assets are undoubtedly of major importance for businesses nowadays. It has even become 481 
an advertising slogan for many companies, by dint of being repeated by human resources and 482 
marketing departments. But subcontractor companies are labor intensive, focusing on manual work, 483 
and they require skills that are acquired almost exclusively from practice (Ng et al. 2009); in this 484 
scenario, human assets are critical (Hall 1994; Eom et al. 2008). The subcontractor's site manager is a 485 
key agent who assures the progress of the works, as well as the subcontractor's profit. 486 
Subcontractors have a great capacity to adapt to the characteristics of each contract, being very 487 
flexible when expanding or reducing their workforce. In many cases, the subcontractor' site manager 488 
assumes as well the role of a supervisor or foreman for the main contractor (Hinze and Tracey 1994). 489 
 490 
During the current recession there have been two different stages in regard to workers dismissal. In 491 
the first stages companies got rid of surplus and less trained personnel (Lim et al. 2010): "The only 492 
good thing about the crisis is that the less productive workers are no longer in the company" (E2); 493 
another interviewee said that "workers now work only according to their skills, and if they are 494 
unskilled they are unemployed" (E7). In the second stage the dismissals affect key personnel of the 495 
organization, jeopardizing the competitiveness of the company (Schleifer 1990): "Now is a time 496 
when we are taking up early retirements for more experience manpower" (E3). Interviewees agree 497 
that companies are struggling to keep construction managers and foremen on staff, especially those 498 
who have better knowledge of the activity: "We seek contracts just to keep our best workers" (E5). 499 
 500 
This surplus of professionals in the market means lower labor costs, and companies that have 501 
adjusted their staff do not have any problems to meet peak demand: "Now manpower is not a 502 
problem, there is a greater deal of unemployment and you can find workers immediately" (E12). 503 
Although the paradox is that there are workers who prefer staying unemployed rather than working 504 
for a month: "They find it more profitable to collect the unemployment subsidy from the 505 
Government than to stop receiving it to work occasionally" (E9). 506 
 507 
All the interviewees recognized the importance of skills and the loyalty of the workforce and the 508 
technical staff (Hall 1994; Ng et al. 2009): "All our workers, in addition to experience, have studied 509 
and they keep on doing so today" (E12). However, not every company solves its training needs in the 510 
same way. Larger companies have training departments with annual budgets to train all levels of 511 
staff, from laborers to senior management: "We take all available grants, and also invest equity in 512 
training" (E1). In contrast to the dominant model that focuses on internal training (Choudry et al. 513 
2012), there are others who prefer to recruit experienced professionals, who work independently 514 
right away: "With current market prices, I cannot spend money on training a worker" (E11). 515 
 516 
On certain occasions, during the expansive economic cycle, companies were faced with the opposite 517 
scenario. There was a great lack of personnel with suitable training and experience. Thus, 518 
contractors, unable to recruit or retain their managers or supervisors, had to rely on the 519 
subcontractors’ foremen and supervisors to perform this role. This has been useful for many 520 
subcontractors who have known their clients “from the inside” and taken advantage of it during the 521 
crisis. 522 
 523 
It is still common to find on-site supervisors or foremen with substantial experience but little formal 524 
training. However, there seems to be a trend to increasingly appreciate formal training. The 525 
increasing specialization of work, depending on the job category of each worker, is leading to a 526 
growing demand for training and a greater appreciation of it. 527 
 528 
Despite the acknowledged ability of subcontractors to accommodate peak demand in contracts, as 529 
they have a flexible workforce, more professionalized subcontractors have in recent years bet on 530 
mechanization (Ng et al. 2009). This trend has been most pronounced in jobs that require more 531 
physical exertion, by introducing more elevation and transport machinery at building sites. 532 
Investment in equipment by certain subcontractors has improved competitiveness as wage costs of 533 
direct labor have increased (Chiang 2009). 534 
 535 
But the most remarkable aspect in regard to human assets is that the more qualified personnel, once 536 
aware of the current situation, begin looking for their own niche in the labor market, either in other 537 
sectors or in other countries. This is causing an accelerated drain of skilled and knowledge-intensive 538 
personnel in the construction industry. Employees who were emigrants employed in the industry are 539 
now returning to their home countries because they are finding better conditions there: "Others are 540 
going on an adventure to countries where they have relatives or simply acquaintances that can offer 541 
them a job" (E7). 542 
 543 
Relationship Assets 544 
 545 
A subcontractor’s corporate image, the relationships of trust established in the sector 546 
(Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000; Kale and Arditi 2001), and the existence of previous links with 547 
the main contractor are key issues to obtain new contracts (Yik and Lai 2008; Ng et al. 2009; Zou and 548 
Lim 2006). This partially contradicts the main factor highlighted in the project-delivery-method 549 
category: that price is the decisive factor when awarding a subcontract (Lim et al. 2010). So, these 550 
"trusting relationships" could be considered as a prerequisite to qualify and bid for contracts. 551 
 552 
The ability of subcontractors to keep up-to-date through their professional network is yet another 553 
key factor underlying their success. These relational ties are maintained both in the informal and 554 
formal sphere (associations, industry groups, professional lobbies, etc.). Most subcontractors believe 555 
that time and resources invested in fostering these relationships are profitable, even though it may 556 
be intangible. Lobbying is crucial for main contractors since they obtain some political influence or 557 
even legal support to appeal public tenders maintaining anonymity; however, subcontractors seek 558 
other objectives in lobbying, mainly related to the provision of services which are more expensive 559 
than when accessing individually: "Our professional association helps us to keep our staff updated 560 
about technical regulations" (E9). Overall satisfaction by members in associations is high: "It works 561 
very well and also keeps us up-to-date on the new products coming to the market" (E10). 562 
 563 
When it comes to updating collective agreements for workers, lobbies are also useful to improve 564 
bargaining power, especially against the unions. Lobbies usually provide other value-added services, 565 
with different degrees of acceptance among its members: "They also have an alert service for 566 
tender, but for us it is of little use, since we have a better service supplied by an outside company" 567 
(E1). Again, the link between trade unions and subcontractors arises, as it does in the previous 568 
discussion on legal framework. 569 
 570 
Although subcontractors seldom form joint ventures, they benefit from the main contractor’s joint-571 
ventures (Arditi et al. 2000). Normally it is one of the members of the consortium who proposes a 572 
particular subcontractor to do certain work. Working for the joint venture is an excellent opportunity 573 
for the other contractors to know first-hand the capabilities of the subcontractor, and thus, the 574 
subcontractor makes a valuable commercial work to attract a new client while fulfilling their 575 
contract. 576 
 577 
 578 
CONCLUSIONS 579 
 580 
Main Contributions of the Research 581 
 582 
This paper analyzes the issues that subcontractors face in an economic crisis scenario and identifies 583 
the factors that are critical for their survival, differentiating those coming from an economic 584 
downturn from those that can be found in any stage of the economic cycle. While the contributions 585 
of this paper are focused specifically on the crisis scenario, the whole set of factors should be 586 
considered in any economic scenario. 587 
 588 
Subcontractors’ need for financial soundness increases during periods of economic crisis. The project 589 
deliver method used by the owner and also by the main contractor is mainly based on price; 590 
therefore the subcontractors’ bids keep getting lower being unprofitable and unsustainable in the 591 
long run. In this particular crisis this fact is exacerbated by the difficulty of getting financial support 592 
from the banks. Hence, it is essential for subcontractors to make a preliminary selection of clients, 593 
focusing on the payment guarantee and method.  594 
 595 
Successful subcontractors establish long-term relationships with their clients warning them of the 596 
problems they might encounter in the construction process and, at the same time, including these 597 
contingencies in their bids. In spite of the trend to award contracts to the lowest bidder, 598 
subcontractors are able to offer value, generating a win-win deal with the general contractor. 599 
Ultimately, this helps to improve their contractual relationship. 600 
 601 
Regarding the human assets, subcontractors tend to lay off workers according to their (inferior) 602 
training, experience, and productivity, not only the employee's cost of dismissal. This is due to the 603 
fact that a skilful and loyal core workforce and technical staff are basic for the survival of the firm. 604 
Moreover, the surplus of professionals in the construction market allows for a decrease in labor 605 
costs. However, qualified personnel, once aware of the current situation, look for their own niche in 606 
the labor market, either in other sectors or other countries.  607 
 608 
The most successful subcontractors became internationalized during the expansion phase of the 609 
cycle, while many others have been forced to do so out of necessity. Furthermore, in an effort to 610 
limit risks, these subcontractors have often gone abroad thanks to one of their regular contractors in 611 
their home country. 612 
 613 
Managerial Implications 614 
 615 
After several years of severe crisis in the construction sector, unprofessional and opportunistic 616 
subcontractors are out of the market. Therefore, most of the existing companies present at least 617 
some of the features described in this research. However, if they do not keep updating their survival 618 
is at risk. In order to guide companies, four key managerial implications are briefly explained next: 619 
financial soundness, relationships with main contractors, flexibility, and a lean hierarchical 620 
organization. In every crisis it is important for the companies to have liquidity; in this particular one, 621 
it is even more important because the banks do not lend money easily. Therefore, subcontractors 622 
should prioritize their financial health above anything else. 623 
 624 
Flexibility is another competitive advantage for the best subcontractors. Subcontractors have to 625 
adapt quickly to new scenarios and, if possible, to plan ahead for them. This makes it easier for 626 
subcontractors to compete not only in their home market, but also abroad. Subcontractors that 627 
invest in their corporate image, build relationships of trust, and that make use of previous links with 628 
the main contractor, perform much better than others; these "trusting relationships" can be 629 
considered as a prerequisite to qualify and bid for the contracts.  Finally, keeping a lean hierarchical 630 
organization with a core professional staff skilful and loyal to the company can help the 631 
subcontractors to achieve their goal too. The accomplishment of these three additional 632 
characteristics can help the subcontractors to attain financial soundness too and, therefore, increase 633 
their chance of survival. 634 
 635 
Limitations and Future Research 636 
 637 
As a final point, the main limitation of this research is that the field work developed was exploratory 638 
and the sample chosen was purposive. Even though outcomes cannot be generalized, this research 639 
does give insight from top managers of successful Spanish subcontractors in a scenario of severe 640 
economic crisis. The factors obtained in this research should be tested and refined in the future with 641 
a larger number of subcontractors, considering time and geographical aspects too. This way, three 642 
future research lines are currently open and underway. First, a broader survey of subcontractors 643 
would allow generalization to the Spanish scenario of economic crisis. Second, the evolution during 644 
the coming years of the twelve companies considered in this research, analyzed as case studies, is 645 
being monitored for a comparison between recession and boom periods. Finally, this research is 646 
being replicated in Brazil in order to compare subcontractors’ behavior in an upward trend scenario 647 
with the downward scenario discussed in this paper. 648 
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 788 
Interviewee Main Activity 
Company’s 
Experience 
(Years) 
No. 
Employees Size 
Interviewee’s 
Position 
Interviewee’s 
Experience 
(Years) 
E1 Maintenance of civil infrastructures and gardening 26 200 M CEO 15 
E2 Reinforced concrete foundations and structures 12 50 S Partner 18 
E3 Industrial painting 19 200 M Partner 18 
E4 Brickwork, masonry and general workforce 13 150 M Site Manager 11 
E5 Concrete forms 29 200 L Marketing Director 23 
E6 Reinforcement steel 26 120 M CEO 15 
E7 Equipment and machinery: general and transportation 10 1100 L 
Marketing 
Director 16 
E8 Equipment and machinery: cranes and special vehicles 23 45 S 
Marketing 
Director 13 
E9 Brickwork, masonry and general workforce 11 60 M CEO 19 
E10 Electric and electronic facilities and maintenance 15 10 S CEO 24 
E11 Earthwork 51 55 M CEO 46 
E12 Hydraulic systems 6 35 S CEO 15 
Table 1. Characterization of interviewees (data from December 31, 2012). 789 
790 
 791 
CATEGORY FACTOR 
FINANCIAL 
CAPITAL 
• During the contraction phase of an economic cycle, subcontractors are driven by each client's 
guarantee of payment, overshadowing profitability 
• During the contraction phase of an economic cycle, subcontractors ask for payments before 
beginning work 
• Subcontractors assume additional financial costs; they are paid later than the main contractor, 
and they have to provide a performance bond for the contract price 
• Because subcontractors assume additional financial costs, they require sound financial support 
and any change in the financial market affects them to a large extent 
• It is difficult for subcontractors to mitigate the risk of the main contractor's default which may 
lead to a chain reaction causing the bankruptcy of the subcontractor too 
LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
• The legal framework affecting occupational health and safety and subcontracting sufficiently 
regulates the relations between the main contractor and its subcontractors 
• Health and safety regulations as well as trade union agreements are generally enforced by 
subcontractors 
DEMAND • During the contraction phase of an economic cycle, competition is among the better and more 
specialized firms that survived the peak of the crisis 
• The contract can be broken down into work packages by the main contractor without realizing 
there are interferences among the different subcontracts 
• Subcontractors are rarely involved in the pre-construction phases or in the subsequent operation 
phase 
GEOGRAPHIC 
SCOPE 
• During the contraction phase of an economic cycle, subcontractors look for contracts abroad 
• Subcontractors look for contracts abroad only with the help of regular clients in their home 
country 
PROJECT 
DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 
• The final decision to award a subcontract is taken by the main contractor based essentially on 
the price bid 
• The main contractor is not willing to pay more for additional quality or reliability that may add 
value to the final product or service, unless these extras can be charged directly to the owner 
• The main contractor often transfers risks to the subcontractor through clauses in the contract 
• Subcontractors’ bargaining position is weaker than that of the main contractor, unless the 
subcontractor executes highly specialized works 
• Subcontractors play a key role in improving projects that start construction with shortcomings 
and lack definition, cooperating with the main contractor 
• The scheduling of the project is not usually negotiated between main contractor and 
subcontractors 
MANAGERIAL 
ASSETS 
• Subcontractors do not usually follow a systematic management process in their construction 
sites 
• It is very common for the subcontracting company to be owned by a single shareholder who 
usually manages the company in a very personal way 
• The owner of the subcontracting company is both the CEO and the commercial director, 
depending on the success of the company and often on his public relations skills 
• Subcontractors often outsource administrative, accounting and financial matters to specialized 
management firms 
• The use of management software by subcontractors is limited to commercial applications (or 
slightly customized) for financial accounting 
HUMAN ASSETS • The subcontractor's site manager is a key agent for assuring the work progress, as well as the 
subcontractor's profit 
• Subcontractors have a great capacity to adapt to the characteristics of each contract, being very 
flexible expanding or reducing their workforce 
• Subcontractors decide to dismiss workers based on training, experience, and productivity, not 
only the employee's cost of dismissal 
• The training of subcontractors' workers is based more on "learning by doing" than on formal 
training, the exception being health and safety regulations 
• In many cases, the subcontractor' site manager performs the additional role of a supervisor or 
foreman for the main contractor 
• Subcontractors have progressively incorporated more equipment to their part of the 
construction project, reducing direct labor as human resource costs increase 
• Due to the long crisis, highly qualified human resources are looking for other kinds of work, in 
CATEGORY FACTOR 
other sectors, or in other countries, decapitalizing the construction industry 
RELATIONSHIP 
ASSETS 
• The subcontractor's corporate image, relationships of trust, and previous links between the 
main contractor and the subcontractor are a prerequisite to tender a contract 
• Subcontractors are increasingly aware of the need to form lobbies to defend their interests as 
construction industry agents or looking for technical support 
• Subcontractors do not usually form joint ventures with other subcontractors to undertake 
greater volumes of work 
• When a joint venture between construction companies is created, the subcontractor proposed 
has an excellent opportunity to expand client portfolio for future contracts 
Note: factors that are specifically relevant in economic downturns are highlighted in bold 
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